Human-Centric AI · Core Ontologies

Values Credentials

The international human-rights instruments — rendered as a queryable, modality-aware concept graph. Every stated right, prohibition and obligation compiled into native .q42 volumes the deontic, epistemic and temporal logic engines reason over directly. Machine‑proposed; human‑attested.

The Curation Prime Directive. The engine proposes; only a signed human attests. Every one of the — concepts below is cml:Proposed / values:HeuristicDerived — structurally provisional and carrying no normative weight until a human signs cml:Attested / skos:exactMatch. Attested so far: 0.

The CML lift — one provision, three layers

Joined through the one 60‑bit hash space, so a concept cml:realizedBy the very byte-identical provision it was derived from.

TEXTun-instruments/*.n3
—
—

Authoritative source text, faithfully transcribed & provenance-stamped (prov:wasDerivedFrom OHCHR).

CONCEPTconcepts/*.n3
—
—

cml:Concept · cml:realizedBy the provision · cml:Proposed

LOGICdeontic norm
Obligation / Right / Prohibition
cml:modality cml:Deontic

A norm with a bearer (borneBy/heldBy) the VM evaluates — defeasible, with the R1 universalisation onto values:State.

Instrument corpus

Illocutionary force & conflict resolution

Norms differ not just in content but in force (Searle, adapted). When two collide, the engine resolves by binding weight — and a non‑derogable norm carries a Hohfeldian immunity no exemption can pierce. Pick two speech-acts to see illocution.rs::resolve_conflict decide.

Norm A
vs
Norm B

Non-derogable core

ICCPR Art. 4(2): even in a public emergency, no derogation. An Exemptive cannot defeat these — Norm::immune blocks the override.

“Person” is frame-relative

Whether person means a human being or extends to legal personality is contextual to the document. The engine records the reading per-document and flags silent capture — one worked instance of a whole class of contested terms.

personReading
HumanOnly · Incorporative · MixedReading
readingStatus
Intended · Declared · Ambiguous · IntentionallyOpaque · AuthorUnaware
UN instruments default to HumanOnly / Intended. An Incorporative reading under IntentionallyOpaque status raises a PersonhoodCaptureRiskFlag.

Spatio-temporal: ratification & jurisdiction

A right exists somewhere, for someone, from some date. The jurisdiction layer carries the State, its sub-jurisdictions, and the ratification act (with entry-into-force).

Australia pilot Illustrative
Commonwealth of Australia ratifies the ICCPR · 8 sub-jurisdictions (VIC, NSW, QLD, WA, SA, TAS, ACT, NT) jur:within the State.
Per-State data to be sourced from treaties.un.org.

How it stays fast & honest

  • One 60-bit hash space. q_hash ≡ generate_60bit_token; the top 4 bits are a tag/modality overlay. Closed datatypes inline; open identifier-kinds resolve as modal predicates.
  • Zero-alloc resolution. The per-cell QuinIndex yields 48-byte NQuins by copy — point lookups with no heap churn in the hot path.
  • Multilingual base. Every natural-language literal is @en-flagged (BCP-47); other languages attach as additional @lang literals on the same subject.
  • Verified, not asserted. All — volumes round-trip: — triples in, the same read back.

Verifiable Credentials runtime

ML-DSA-65 · fail-closed

A credential is a signed set of claims bound to an identifier — it is not identity. Identity is the relational structure built over a fabric of identifiers (machine proposes skos:closeMatch; a signed human ratifies skos:exactMatch; never fully resolved). Verifiability authenticates a claim's origin, not its truth: a perfectly-signed credential can still be false-in-fact, so credentials enter the same divergence-preserving machinery as any other evidence — held alongside contradicting records, never auto-promoted to fact. (Lineage: W3C Credentials CG → Verifiable Claims → VC Data Model.)

Wired today
  • issue / present / verify over the W3C VC Data Model (@context, type, issuer, credentialSubject, proof).
  • Real ML-DSA-65 (FIPS-204) signatures via fiduciary_crypto.
  • Fail-closed verification: missing proof, tampering, or a bad signature return an error — never a silent true.
Codecs & access
  • OpenBadge v3 and PDF codecs over one unified Credential type.
  • Access-tier gate (AccessModality / DataTier): can_access(tier, is_verified) fails closed on an unverified holder.
Custody, Revocation & ZK Roadpath
  • Holder custody vault — hold() binds to local key_vault Sanctuary storage.
  • Status & revocation — StatusResult integrates with temporal validity and revocation lists.
  • Selective / ZK disclosure — pairs W3C VC presentations with zk_proofs Groth16 circuits.
Rust API — crates/qualia-core-db/src/identity/credentials/
let runtime = VcRuntime::new(fiduciary_crypto);

// Issuer signs a credential (ML-DSA-65)
let signed = runtime.issue(credential, Some("issuer-key"))?;

// Holder bundles credentials into a signed presentation
let vp = runtime.present(vec![signed], Some("holder-key"))?;

// Verifier checks origin — fail-closed (Err on tamper/missing/bad-sig)
let ok: bool = runtime.verify_presentation(&vp)?;

// Tiered access gate (fails closed for an unverified holder)
AccessModality::Read.can_access(DataTier::Sensitive, is_verified)?;

Executed via the native Rust VcRuntime API with ML-DSA-65 post-quantum signatures and fail-closed verification.

Four-Plane Identifier Fabric (IDF-01–IDF-05) & F5/F6 Firewalls

ontologies/identifier_fabric_shapes.ttl

In QualiaDB, Verifiable Credentials live strictly on the Claim Plane. The Identifier Fabric partitions records across four disjoint planes so that a signed credential, a network locator, or a cryptographic key is never conflated with a human being:

1. Entity (Who Plane)

NaturalAgent (living-SHACL), LegalEntity, and SystemAgent. Disjoint from owl:Thing, idf:Instrument, and idf:SpatiotemporalHandle. Never merged by similarity, handle, wallet, location, or biometrics; owl:sameAs is forbidden on the Who plane (SameAsError::WhoPlaneForbidden).

2. Claim Plane

Scoped, signed assertions (VerifiableCredential, idf:ClaimOpinion, idf:AssertionClaim, idf:RoleCapacityGrant, deontic/epistemic norms) with provenance and expiry. VCs prove cryptographic origin integrity of an issuer's statement, not universal ontological truth.

3. Handle Plane

Revocable, rotatable network or directory locators (idf:SpatiotemporalHandle, DNI / idf:DigitalNetworkIdentifier, DNS, email, did:qi endpoints). Revoking a handle closes the channel without erasing the Entity.

4. Instrument Plane

Cryptographic keys, hardware tokens, and software tools (idf:Instrument, idf:AiAgent, idf:MachineDevice) classified by InstrumentProofClass (CryptographicOriginIntegrity, HardwareChannelPossession, SemanticClaimEvaluation) and closed KeyRole (IdentityAssertion, CredentialSigning, TransportHandshake, StorageEncryption, RecoveryBootstrap).

Typed Cross-Plane Evidence Morphisms

Cross-plane links use explicit evidence predicates: idf:supportedByInstrument (Claim → Instrument), idf:assertedAbout (Claim → Entity), and idf:observedAtHandle (Claim/Event → Handle).

F5 & F6 Anti-Feature Firewalls

Both the F5 (compile-time VibeScript) and F6 (runtime ingress/query) firewalls reject entity-collapsing predicates (person_score, identity_confidence, and same_person).

Modalities Observatory

Run deontic, epistemic, temporal logic live

CML Studio

Author concept-markup-language context

Ontology Browser

Explore the loaded vocabularies

7-Tier Epistemic Provenance

Epistemic Provenance & 4-Axis Temporal Decay

evaluate_epistemic_wasm · SensitivityClass::Restricted

Every biological, clinical, and kinematic claim carries a 7-tier EpistemicTier (DirectlyObserved .. AuthorialIntent), a 52-variant q42m:* ObservationMethod (tape measure, DEXA, QCT, MRI, XROMM, IMU, clinical FHIR/EHR), an ObserverRole, 4-axis half-life confidence decay, and optional SensitivityClass::Restricted envelope sealing.

Confidence: 0.903 · Envelope: Open